The vested interest construct suggests that people act in attitudinally consistent ways on important issues of high hedonic relevance. Accordingly, vested individuals should endorse policies consistent with their attitudes. Symbolic politics holds self-interest unrelated to attitude and thus of little use. Three secondary analyses of national election data assessed the predictive utility of vested interest on policy-related issues. Consistent with expectations, Analysis 1 found vested interest to be unrelated to policy endorsement. However, Analysis 2 disclosed that vested interest significantly moderated attitude-endorsement consistency on beliefs regarding busing, health insurance, and government-guaranteed living standards. Analysis 3 investigated vested interest effects across three national election surveys and six policy issues. Without exception, vested interest significantly moderated the relationship between attitudes and policy endorsement. These results, obtained across a broad range of topics and respondents, suggest that vested interest is an important moderator of consistency between attitudes and policy endorsement. © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA) Coinciding with the development of dual process models of attitude change in social psychology is the complementary consideration of the effect of personal relevance on the behavioral expression of attitudes and on attitude-criterion consistency (Chaiken, 1987; Converse, 1964 Converse, , 1970 Crano, 1995 Crano, , 1997a Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Miller, 1999; Petty & Cacioppo, 1990; Sears & Funk, 1991) . From Hovland's time onward, involvement has played a consequential role in theories of attitude (Crano, 2000; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953 ). Today's models emphasize these constructs in developing hypotheses regarding the likelihood that a persuasive message will be elaborated and that resultant attitudes will guide future behaviors and policy endorsements (Petty & Krosnick, 1995) . Although the precise function of involvement in the attitude-criterion equation is not yet specified, most social psychologists contend that such constructs play a central role in attitude change and attitude-criterion consistency.
Coinciding with the development of dual process models of attitude change in social psychology is the complementary consideration of the effect of personal relevance on the behavioral expression of attitudes and on attitude-criterion consistency (Chaiken, 1987; Converse, 1964 Converse, , 1970 Crano, 1995 Crano, , 1997a Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Miller, 1999; Petty & Cacioppo, 1990; Sears & Funk, 1991) . From Hovland's time onward, involvement has played a consequential role in theories of attitude (Crano, 2000; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953 ). Today's models emphasize these constructs in developing hypotheses regarding the likelihood that a persuasive message will be elaborated and that resultant attitudes will guide future behaviors and policy endorsements (Petty & Krosnick, 1995) . Although the precise function of involvement in the attitude-criterion equation is not yet specified, most social psychologists contend that such constructs play a central role in attitude change and attitude-criterion consistency.
Two qualities distinguish vested interest from other concepts related to personal involvement. First, vested interest requires that the attitude object be hedonically relevant (Crano, 1995; Sivacek & Crano, 1982) . Second, only objects considered important, or consequential, are deemed of high vested interest. Hedonic relevance is concerned with the perceived consequences of the attitude object for the daily life of the respondent 1 An attitude object may be considered important but not hedonically relevant (e.g., a major earthquake in a far-off country) or hedonically relevant but not particularly important. To the extent that either prerequisite is not present, the predictive power of the construct will be diminished. Support for the concept of self-or vested interest in political research can be traced to the pioneering efforts of Muzafir Sherif in his work on ego involvement (e.g., Sherif & Cantril, 1947; Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Kelly, Rodgers, Sarup, & Tittler, 1973) . Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall (1965) examined involvement in political elections and found that highly ego-involved individuals were more likely to take part in political action. Since that time, ego involvement has been refined in experimental (Crano & Prislin, 1995; Sivacek & Crano, 1982) and applied (Crano & Burgoon, in press; Krosnick, 1988) contexts. Furthermore, tests of the elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1990) have demonstrated the role of personal consequences in motivating individuals to process information.
Definitions of issue involvement, self-interest, vested interest, and personal relevance have not been consistently articulated, and only rarely have comparisons been made among these constructs. In a commendable effort to clarify existing conceptualizations, Johnson and Eagly (1989) conducted an exhaustive meta-analytic review that outlined three distinct forms of personal involvement: value-relevant, outcome-relevant, and impression-relevant involvement. Their meta-analysis suggests that each form of involvement may have different effects on attitude and attitude change. Vested interest is aligned with Johnson and Eagly's concept of outcome-relevant personal involvement, defined as making "salient . . . the relevance of an issue" to important goals or outcomes (p. 292). However, there are two important differences between outcome-relevant involvement and vested interest. First, although Johnson and Eagly suggested that the attitude object must be important, some of the topics they classified as being outcome relevant would not appear important enough to be considered highly vested (e.g., Petty, Caccioppo, & Schumann, 1983) . Second, the definition of "outcome" used by Johnson and Eagly (1989) is narrower than that hypothesized by vested interest. They defined an outcome as "an explicit personal goal that one expects to obtain relatively soon mainly by one's own efforts and that directs aspects of one's behavior" (p. 293, emphasis added). It is easy to see how purchases would fit into this conceptualization. However, it seems doubtful that most students would see a change from a semester system to a trimester system as an explicit personal goal that one would be able to obtain relatively soon through individual effort. In fact, this definition makes it difficult to understand how many policy-relevant attitudes could be conceptualized as "outcomes." 2 Although the current research focuses on vested interest, the policy studies research tradition to which this study contributes typically uses the term "self-interest," which is concerned with the relationship between an action and maximizing personal gain. In contrast to the literature in social psychology, many policy studies researchers have suggested that self-interest has limited effects on policy preferences, voting, and appraisals of political candidates or as a moderator of policy opinion (Bobo, 1997; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & Funk, 1991) . This viewpoint also is prominent in mainstream socialpsychological approaches to political behavior (e.g., Kinder, 1998) . Much of the political research on self-interest and policy endorsement is concerned with the influence of symbolic attitudes on political behavior (Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 1997; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, 1988; Sears & Funk, 1991; Sears & McConahay, 1973) . Symbolic attitudes are long-standing predispositions formed during childhood that influence adults' perceptions and actions. In theory, adults respond affectivity "to symbols which resemble the attitude objects to which similar emotional responses were conditioned or associated in early life. Whether or not the issue has some tangible consequence for the adult voter's personal life is irrelevant" (Sears, Hensler, & Speer, 1979, pp. 370 -371) .
Research on symbolic politics typically suggests a minor role of self-interest in political behavior. In a comprehensive review, Sears and Funk (1991) demonstrated across a number of domains that self-interest did not predict policy endorsements. Parents whose children were to be bused, for example, did not appear to be more antagonistic to busing than did those whose children were not to be bused. Responding to this position, Crano (1997a) identified two oversights common in most symbolic politics research. First, the approach assumes that all of those categorized as highly vested will respond in a similar way on policy endorsement measures. That is, the anticipated direction of the self-interest effect is defined a priori by the researcher, who decides whether or not a particular position serves respondents' best interests. Furthermore, as elaborated in the example below, self-interest effects generally are tested using linear regression in a manner that biases results against a self-interest interpretation.
According to tests of self-interest from the symbolic attitudes perspective, regardless of their racial attitudes, low-income Whites should categorically oppose policies to provide housing assistance to low-income African Americans. A self-interest effect would be identified only if the effects of self-interest were present after effects of racial prejudice had been statistically removed from the policy endorsement measure. The multiple regression approach used to assess self-interest effects requires that the measure of self-interest be linearly related to policy preference. From one standpoint, this may be reasonable; low-income Whites, on the whole, probably do not support housing assistance to Blacks. However, given the manner in which the standard test is made, not only would low-income (White) respon-dents need to oppose the policy, but high-income Whites would need to support it, if a self-interest orientation were to be corroborated. This assumed complementarity of outcome preferences based on variations in vested interest is logically unnecessary and psychologically implausible. This approach biases such investigations against positive selfinterest outcomes and cannot be derived from any reasonable theoretical position on the effects of vested interest on policy endorsement.
The analytic approach used in symbolic politics assumes a main effects orientation; if self-interest matters, then its variations should be systematically associated with policy endorsements. In contrast to this orientation, vested interest suggests that there should be greater congruence between policy-relevant attitudes and policy endorsements of highly vested (as opposed to nonvested) individuals. Personal relevance does not have any necessary implications for the likelihood of endorsement of a given policy. Rather, highly vested attitudes are stronger and therefore more likely to be expressed through behavior or policy endorsement (Crano, 1995) . Vested interest moderates the relationship between attitude and policy endorsement, but it does not necessarily predict which policy will be endorsed. In this light, the lack of association between vested interest and policy endorsement is nonprescriptive; it does not bear critically on the validity of the construct. Consider parents whose children are to be bused in the interests of racial equality. Earlier research in the symbolic politics tradition (e.g., Sears et al., 1979) assumed that all such parents were highly vested in the issue and, if self-interest held, should therefore be opposed to the policy. A weak correlation between categorized self-interest and (non)endorsement of busing was taken to suggest a lack of utility of the self-interest construct. From a vested interest perspective, this study has little to do with the utility of vested interest (Crano, 1997a) . First, it is not possible to determine whether all parents whose children were to be bused considered the issue hedonically relevant or important. Furthermore, even if all parents were highly vested, it is not reasonable to assume that they all were opposed to the policy itself. Surely, some held positive racial attitudes that would have led them to support busing policy. Nonprejudicial racial attitudes of vested individuals are not taken into account in main effects tests of selfinterest on policy endorsement. Prior work in the symbolic politics tradition would seem to provide a fair test of the vested interest orientation only when all vested individuals held identical attitudes. In such circumstances, self-interest would function as a proxy for attitude and thereby directly predict policy endorsement. However, in the case of important and controversial social issues-taxation, job training, housing support, abortion, busing, Vietnam, and so on-the assumption of such unanimity within an identifiable class of respondents is implausible. Considering only the direct effects of self-interest on political opinion is almost certain to generate results that distort the effect of vested interest.
The research to be undertaken is a further examination of the moderating effects of vested interest. The analyses substantially expand the populations, and the realm of issues, to which the vested interest model is applied. Two factors motivated the analyses. First, Sears (1997) cited his earlier work as exemplary of a failure of self-interest. Our first two analyses use the data on which his conclusion was based to reexamine this conclusion. Using the same data as Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen (1980) , Analysis 1 examines the association of vested interest, attitudes, and policy endorsements across three domains (national health insurance, busing, and governmental assistance to ensure living standards).
3 Analysis 2 improves the attitude scales and tests for theory-relevant interactive effects of vested interest on the attitude-endorsement relationship. Analysis 3 draws on Kinder and Sanders' (1996) work, which examined the role of racial intolerance, thus expanding the range of policyrelevant issues in which vested interest is investigated. Analysis 3 combines several analyses from the data set used by Kinder and Sanders with results from the 1972 and 1976 National Election Studies (NES). It reveals the pervasive impact of vested interest across a range of policy issues and populations. These analyses are presented to provide a more informative and valid assessment of the role of vested interest as a moderator of attitude-criterion consistency and to do so using data whose earlier analysis provided apparently null results.
ANALYSIS 1 Method

Sample
Data from the 1976 NES were used to reexamine endorsement of policy in three domains (government assurances of an adequate living standard, national health insurance, and busing to achieve school integration). Respondents were drawn from a large national random sample of voters. As suggested by NES guidelines, the sample was weighted to maintain representativeness (Sears et al., 1980 , also used weighted data). The weighted number of respondents in this analysis was 2,403; however, missing data prevented the entire set from being used in most analyses.
Measures Self-interest. The self-interest items used were identical to those of Sears et al. (1980) . For the analysis of living standard guarantees, unemployment of respondent or family head, 4 perceptions that the respondent or family were worse off financially than in the previous year, and an index of four items related to the effects of the recession on the respondent were used as separate indicators of self-interest. Self-interest on guaranteed health insurance policy endorsements was indicated by absence of personal health insurance coverage, a belief that the individual would have to borrow money in the case of a serious illness, and a belief that insurance coverage is excessively costly. Respondents with children in public schools, with children who did not already take the bus to school, or who were living in areas where busing was happening or was rumored were considered to be self-interested in busing policy.
Symbolic attitudes. Sears et al. (1980) constructed three "symbolic attitude" measures. The first was a single-item 7-point measure of party identification. The second attitude measure was a conservatism scale that assessed self-identification (as liberal or conservative), left or right orientation, and two feeling thermometers (in which people were asked to rate their feelings toward liberals or conservatives on a 100-point continuum). Because of the large variance among the items to be combined, standardized z scores were calculated for each before their combination.
5 A mean of the standardized scores was formed for each respondent if data were available on at least two of the three variables. The calculated scale was normally distributed (␣ ϭ .76). A measure of racial prejudice was formed by combining feeling thermometers toward Blacks and Black militants with attitudes on whether "civil rights are pushing too fast" and with opinions regarding residential desegregation policy. These variables were standardized before a mean racial prejudice measure was formed for each participant who had responded to at least three of the five items. The new variable was normally distributed (␣ ϭ .66). Sniderman and Tetlock (1986) criticized the use of political opinions (e.g., those related to residential desegregation) as both a component and an outcome of racial intolerance, and symbolic attitude researchers have avoided this approach in recent work. However, to maintain consistency with Sears et al. (1980) , this measure is used in Analysis 1. A new racial prejudice scale was developed and used in Analysis 2.
Policy endorsement. For the living standards analysis, policy endorsement was measured through the mean of preand post-election responses on the government's role in "seeing to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living" (r ϭ .52). If only the pre-or posttest response was available, then that variable was used. Policy endorsement for health insurance was measured through a single item indicating preference for government provision of medical and hospital coverage. A scale based on five variables was created to assess endorsement of busing policy. Three variables constructed from an open-ended busing question were combined with statements on the use of busing to achieve racial integration and a measure of whether or not the government should ensure racial integration in the schools. As before, standardized z scores were created, and a mean of all variables was computed (␣ ϭ .68). Analyses also included measures of age, education, family income, sex, and race.
Results and Discussion
Independent analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between self-interest and policy endorsement across the three policy domains. Data were entered in three steps in hierarchical multiple regression analyses. The selfinterest indicator was entered in the first step. Then, indicators of symbolic attitudes (conservative ideology, political affiliation, and racial intolerance) were entered. 6 Demographic variables were entered on the third step.
As shown in Table 1 , our results did not find direct effects of self-interest on two of the three policy endorsement measures. Although we did not exactly replicate Sears et al. (1980) , their overall pattern was confirmed. The differences found between the original analyses of Sears et al. and our replication are most likely due to strategies for addressing missing data or for combining variables. As noted, we combined standardized variables for the policy measures and calculated variables only when at least two of the three items were available. It is unclear what method Sears et al. used to account for missing data or for unequal item variation, but it seems likely that the minor differences in results are attributable to different analytic strategies. Minor differences aside, our analyses found results similar to those reported by Sears et al. (1980) . Consistent with the original analyses, the current research found few direct effects of self-interest on policy endorsement. Our research did find that respondents who had a vested interest in health insurance were more likely to endorse a national health insurance policy (a direct effect of vested interest), as did Sears et al. Overall, however, the results of Analysis 1 are consistent with the contention that vested interest generally does not have direct effects on policy opinions. The unemployed did not necessarily believe that the government should assure every individual a certain standard of living, and White people with school-age children enrolled in public schools were not any more likely to oppose busing than were other White respondents. These findings are not at all unforeseen. As argued, vested interest is not expected to have a direct effect on policy measures; rather, it is expected to affect the likelihood that a vested individual will endorse policy in an attitude-consistent manner. ANALYSIS 2 In contrast to the type of analyses usually reported (e.g., Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sears et al., 1979 Sears et al., , 1980 , our approach does not presuppose that individuals with a high stake in policy matters necessarily take any particular stance on political issues. Analysis 1 is moot with respect to the moderating effects of vested interest. Analysis 2 was conducted to examine the moderating role of vested interest in the attitude-criterion relationship in the three policy domains examined in Analysis 1.
In addition to the variables used in Analysis 1, a new measure tapping attitudes toward the poor was created. It appeared to be more applicable to the critical policy issues than did the more global measures (liberal-conservative ideology and political party identification) used by Sears et al. (1980) . This measure was developed because attitudecriterion consistency is likely to be maximized when attitude and criterion measures are at similar levels of specificity (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977) . Because it is rare that citizens have the opportunity to directly endorse specific governmental policies, and because it would be difficult to obtain behavioral indicators of policy opinion (e.g., signatures on petitions, donations to political causes) from a nationally representative sample, policy endorsement (as opposed to behavior) is the central dependent variable used for the current research. In a sense, endorsement can be viewed as a very specific attitude directed toward a particular policy. In the context of the current research, policy endorsements are expected to be closer approximations of behavior than are the more general attitude measures used as predictor measures. Although this strategy is distinct from that used in other domains in which vested interest has been examined (e.g., Sivacek & Crano, 1982) , such diverse tests strengthen the generalizability of the construct.
Method
Sample
Weighted data from the 1976 NES again were used in these analyses. Sample sizes were 1,578, 1,781 and 1,673 for the health insurance, employment, and busing analyses, respectively. The sample sizes for the employment and health insurance topics are similar to those of Analysis 1.
Measures
Measures of self-interest, symbolic politics, and demographics as well as policy endorsements of health care, government guarantees of living standard, and busing, as described in Analysis 1, were used in Analysis 2. Indexes of vested interest were formed for each policy area.
Vested interest. Four levels of vested interest in health insurance were established. People with the largest stake in health insurance policy, those who were uninsured, were considered to be the most vested. Those who reported that their health insurance was excessively costly and that they would need to borrow large amounts of money in the event of an extended absence from work were considered somewhat less vested. Those with either excessively costly insurance or coverage inadequate to cover serious health problems were defined as less vested. The least vested individuals were those who had insurance that was not excessively expensive and who would not have to borrow large amounts of money if ill. Employment status, defined as whether the head of the household was employed or unemployed, was used as the indicator of vested interest for the analysis of government assurances of quality living standards. Three variables were used to determine vested interest in busing policy. As with Crano (1997a) , individuals defined as highly vested had children in public schools and were living in areas where busing was currently happening or was rumored.
Attitudes toward the poor. A new scale, which served as the (symbolic) attitude measure for the health insurance and employment analyses, was created to reflect attitudes toward poor people. The 1976 NES study contained a set of seven such items, similar in format to those used to measure racial attitudes. A factor analysis with varimax rotation suggested that six of the seven poverty items loaded onto a single factor that explained 36.7% of the interitem variance. These items (e.g., "The poor are poor because the wealthy and powerful keep them poor," "The seniority system in most companies works against poor people-they're the last to be hired and the first to be fired") were combined to form a mean poverty attitude measure for each individual who responded to at least four of the six items (␣ ϭ .73). An interaction term between vested interest (in health care or economic measures) and attitudes toward poverty was created for both policy domains. The interaction term was used to test the moderating effect of vested interest.
Racial attitudes. To create a new measure of racial attitudes that did not include the policy opinions used by Sears et al. (1980) , a factor analysis was conducted on eight racial attitude items. These items formed a single factor accounting for 34.6% of the interitem variance. Sample items included agreement with claims that "civil rights leaders are trying to push too fast" and that "it's lack of skill and abilities that keep many Black people from getting a job," along with two 100-point feeling thermometer scores on Blacks and Black militants. A mean racial attitude score was computed across respondents who answered at least five of the eight items (standardized scores were used to offset unequal item variation). Reliability of the measure was of acceptable magnitude (␣ ϭ .72).
Results and Discussion
Multiple regression analyses were used to test the effects of vested interest on endorsement of health insurance, federal guarantees of living standards, and busing policies. These analyses provide an estimate of the direct influence of demographic variables, attitudes, and vested interest on policy endorsement as well as of the unique contribution of the attitude by vested interest interaction. For each analysis, demographic variables (e.g., age, party identification) were entered into the first step of a hierarchical multiple regression equation. To increase the power of our test and account for as much variance as possible, the only non-theoryrelevant variables included in the analysis were those that were significantly related to policy endorsement in Analysis 1. Next, the relevant attitude measure and the indicator of vested interest were added. Finally, the attitude by vested interest interaction term was added to the equation.
Living Standard
As expected, the living standard analysis revealed that vested interest moderated the relationship between attitudes toward the poor and policy opinion. As the final beta weight in Table 2 (␤ ϭ .40, p Ͻ .025) indicates, this variable had an important impact after all other variables were included, suggesting that the attitude-criterion relationship was substantially greater among more highly vested respondents. In addition, results indicate a direct effect of unemployment (␤ ϭ .19, p Ͻ .01); the unemployed were significantly more supportive of government assurances of a high standard of living. The analysis further disclosed that individuals with more sympathetic attitudes toward the poor, those with more liberal ideological orientations, and those who selfidentify as Democrats were more likely to support government assurances of employment (p Ͻ .01). Finally, the analysis indicates that Whites, males, and higher income individuals were significantly less supportive of government assistance in ensuring jobs than were respondents without these characteristics (p Ͻ .001). Overall, the variables included in the analysis explained 31.09% of the variance in living standards policy endorsement.
Health Care
The analysis of health care policy opinions also suggests that vested interest plays an important moderating role in attitude-endorsement consistency. For this analysis, there was a strong direct effect of vested interest on health care policy endorsement (␤ ϭ .26, p Ͻ .0005). Those who had the most difficulty with their current insurance (i.e., were uninsured or had excessively costly insurance) were significantly more likely to support a national health insurance policy. The significant effect of the interaction term indicates that vested interest (␤ ϭ .24, p Ͻ .05) plays a moderating role in the attitude-endorsement relationship: Attitude toward the poor was a better predictor of health care policy opinions for the more highly vested respondents. Demographic variables indicate that older and poor respondents (p Ͻ .05) were more likely to prefer public health insurance and that people who identified themselves as Democrats or liberals, and who expressed less blame in their attitudes toward the impoverished, were more supportive of public health insurance. As shown in Table 2 , 21.1% of the variance on health care policy endorsement was explained by the variables in the regression model.
Busing
The final multiple regression analysis of Analysis 2 examined the role of vested interest in policy endorsement of the use of busing to achieve school integration. As with the health and living standard analyses, the hypothesis that vested interest had a moderating effect on the relationship between attitude (in this case, racial attitudes) and the policy endorsement was supported (␤ ϭ Ϫ.16, p Ͻ .001). As shown in Table 2 , there was no direct effect of vested interest on the criterion (␤ ϭ .02, p Ͼ .40). Respondents who lived in areas where busing was happening or was rumored and who had children attending public schools were not significantly more likely to oppose (or support) busing policies. This null result replicates Crano's (1997a) analysis of the 1972 NES data and is in agreement with results reported by Sears et al. (1979) . Direct effects of racial attitudes and ideology (liberalism vs conservatism) were found (␤s ϭ Ϫ.19 and .09, respectively, both ps Ͻ .001). Respondents who expressed more negative racial attitudes and who identified themselves as more politically conservative were less likely to support busing policy. As shown in Table 2 , the complete model accounted for a total of 24.2% of the variance in the busing criterion measure. A dichotomously coded race variable (African Americans vs all others) was the only demographic variable to contribute significantly to the model. Although the symbolic politics approach normally computes independent analyses for Black and White respondents, it is reasonable to include both groups in tests of vested interest: African Americans have arguably the strongest vested interest in questions relating to the busing of Black children and therefore should be included.
These analyses demonstrate the role of vested interest in moderating the attitude-endorsement relationship on important political issues. Furthermore, they suggest a strong impact of vested interest under the least auspicious conditions in that this variable was of necessity defined by objective demographic criteria rather than by respondents' own endorsements of the importance and hedonic relevance of the issues. If this latter approach to defining vested interest had been feasible, then it is almost certain that even stronger moderating effects of vested interest would have emerged. In each of the previously reported analyses, individuals with highly vested attitudes were more likely to express consistent policy endorsements than were nonvested respondents. However, some skepticism may remain because the results reported in Table 2 all were derived from data collected in the 1976 NES sample. As such, the results may be interpreted as applicable only to specific policy domains at one point in time. Analysis 3 was undertaken in response to this time-bound alternative explanation. ANALYSIS 3 In Analysis 3, data from the 1972, 1976, and 1986 NESs were used to examine the role of vested interest in disparate policy domains. Descriptions of the variables and sample in the 1976 NES were elaborated earlier in this article and so are described only briefly here. In addition to these two data sets, we chose to explore the 1986 NES study because it provides a rich array of attitude and policy measures that were used extensively by Kinder and Sanders (1996) in their influential monograph. Consistent with earlier research by Sears and his colleagues, Kinder and Sanders suggested that self-interest played little or no (direct) role in policy endorsement.
Participants
The1986 NES included responses from 2,176 voters drawn from a national random sample. Unlike the analyses conducted by Kinder and Sanders, these analyses included African American respondents. Table 3 shows the variables used for each of the tests performed. The variables used for the 1976 analyses were described earlier in this article and so are not restated here. Aside from the analyses from the 1976 NES, most of the items used for this analysis came from the 1986 NES, as described below. In addition, the 1972 NES data set was used for one analysis, as briefly outlined.
NES measures in 1972. The 1972 analysis was concerned with endorsement of busing to achieve school integration. Respondents who had school-age children in public schools, lived in predominantly single-race neighborhoods, and were living in districts where busing was happening or was rumored were considered to be vested. A racial intolerance measure was created from eight items similar to those used in the 1976 analysis (Crano, 1997a) . The policy endorsement measure was based on a single item assessing support or opposition for busing (as opposed to keeping children in neighborhood schools).
Racial intolerance in 1986. Because all policy measures that were examined in the 1986 data set concerned racial policy matters, racial intolerance was used as the attitude component of all analyses. A scale of acceptable reliability (␣ ϭ .77), which included items such as "Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve" and "Many Blacks who receive money from welfare programs could get along without it if they tried" (the same variables as were used by Kinder & Sanders, 1986) , was formed for each participant who responded to at least three of the six items.
Vested interest in 1986. Separate indicators of vested interest were constructed for each of the three analyses of the 1986 data (federal spending on Blacks, employment assistance for Blacks, and busing to facilitate school integration). The first measure indicated whether or not the respondent's family was living below the poverty level. This variable was created using family income and family size variables as well as poverty thresholds published by the U.S. Census Bureau (1986) . This measure was used as an indicator of vested interest on endorsement of federal spending on Blacks. People who were unemployed, were laid off, or had been unemployed during the past 6 months were considered to have a vested interest in policy relating to government efforts to ensure jobs for unemployed African Americans. Finally, respondents with high school children (ages 14 -17 years) were assumed to have a vested interest in the use of quotas in college admissions. Because of limitations in available NES measures, this measure is broader than desired.
Policy endorsement in 1986. Endorsements of policy in three different domains were defined through single-item indicators. First, respondents were asked to indicate whether they thought that federal spending on Blacks should be increased, be decreased, or remain the same. The second analysis was concerned with participants' endorsement of policy suggesting that the government should "make every effort to improve the social and economic position of Blacks and other minority groups" or rather let such groups "help themselves." Finally, respondents' endorsement of the use of quotas in college admissions was examined through a single dependent variable.
Results and Discussion
The major purpose of this analysis was to examine the role of vested interest in moderating the relationship between attitudes and policy endorsement on a range of issues. A total of seven analyses, using data from three different national (NES) surveys in five different policy domains, suggest that vested interest is an important moderator of political opinion. The major concern with using multiple tests from a single data set (the topics of health insurance, employment policy, and busing all were examined using the 1976 data set) was to ensure that individual respondents 7 Kinder and Sanders (1996) omitted responses from African Americans in their analyses. To replicate Kinder and Sander's work, we also conducted the analyses using only White respondents. Although the pattern of results for both analyses was the same, the analyses including African Americans were somewhat stronger, and the overlap among vested groups (as will be discussed later) was slightly higher (16.0% vs 14.1%). who were identified as vested in one policy domain were not, in general, vested in other domains. Although some individuals vested in one group would be expected to be vested in another, too much overlap would not allow independent tests of effects. Both Analyses 2 and 3 used multiple analyses from single data sets, which can be problematic when trying to combine effect sizes or to claim independence of tests. As shown in Table 4 , however, the analyses reported here have minimal overlap among vested groups. The diagonal values in Table 4 show the total number of classified vested respondents who did not have missing data on any of the variables used to test moderator effects. The table is best read across, with values indicating the percentage of individuals in the vested group listed in the left-most column who also are vested in the areas listed in the two other columns. For example, in the 1976 analyses, 11.0% of people who were unemployed (vested in the employment analyses) were also vested in the health insurance analysis. Conversely, 18.1% of those who did not have health insurance were also unemployed. These percentages differ because of the total number of vested individuals in the group and the amount of missing data for each particular analysis. When the overlap data for all analyses in the 1976 study are aggregated, the average percentage of overlap is 15.5%; for the 1986 analyses, it is 16.0%. These values were considered to be sufficiently low to allow for an examination of the moderating effects of vested interest. The analyses reported here all have minimal overlap among vested groups and use different dependent variables.
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After establishing the relative independence of the seven analyses, moderating effects of vested interest on the attitude-endorsement relationship were examined using a method advocated by Crano (1997a Crano ( , 1997b . The correlation coefficient representing the relationship between each symbolic attitude and policy endorsement measure was calculated for the nonvested and vested groups in each policy domain. All correlations were strong and statistically significant, indicating that attitudes had a substantial association with policy endorsement, a result consistent with both the symbolic politics and the vested interest orientations. The correlations, along with 99% confidence intervals drawn on the nonvested samples, are shown in Fig. 1 . The attitude-criterion correlations for the vested samples are also presented. In each and every instance, the attitudecriterion correlation calculated in the vested sample fell outside the 99% confidence interval of the nonvested participants' attitude-criterion correlation. Indeed, in most comparisons, the attitude-criterion correlations of the highly vested groups fell well beyond the 99.9% confidence intervals of the nonvested groups.
To compare the observed pairs of correlation coefficients statistically, we calculated a mean correlation for both the vested and nonvested groups across all policy areas. The average correlation for the vested groups was .57 when it was not weighted according to the number of participants used in the analysis; this figure changed only slightly (less than .01) when weighted by sample size (Rosenthal, 1991) . The mean correlation for the nonvested individuals was considerably lower, at .43 (unweighted) and .42 (weighted). Meta-analytic procedures were used to determine whether the attitude-criterion relationship differed between the highly vested and nonvested respondents. As recommended by Rosenthal (1991) , the effect sizes (r) expected to have the largest effects were assigned positive lambda weights, and those expected to have smaller effects (the nonvested correlations) were given negative weights. As a preliminary examination of the relationship between obtained and expected effects, the r alerting 2 (determined by correlating the lambda weights with each effect size obtained) was calculated (Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000) . The results of this calculation (r alerting 2 ϭ .74) provide strong support for vested interest, suggesting that the effects obtained for vested groups were considerably higher than those obtained for nonvested groups. Also, as expected, the correlations for vested groups were significantly greater than the correlations for nonvested groups (Z ϭ 3.96, p ϭ .00005). Independent tests of moderation, conducted to determine whether the findings of either the 1976 or 1986 studies differed significantly from the others, revealed no support for either of these possibilities (Z ϭ Ϫ0.97, p ϭ .83, and Z ϭ 1.11, p ϭ .13, respectively).
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In Analysis 3, the moderating effect of vested interest was evident across three major NES surveys, seven analyses, and five different policy areas. The results expand considerably the domains in which the hypothesized effects of vested interest have been tested and confirmed. Although the magnitude of the effect varies somewhat across analyses, the overall pattern is clear. In every case, the attitudecriterion relationship was substantially greater among those for whom the critical issue was self-relevant. The generality of the vested interest effect is impressive, as is its magnitude. These results are important because they demonstrate that substantial moderating effects of vested interest discovered in Analysis 2 were not the results of anomalous data patterns specific to a restricted range of issues.
The symbolic politics position holds that symbolic attitudes formed early in life are responsible for policy-relevant behavior, whereas self-interest is expected to have little effect on behavior or on policy endorsement. Analyses 2 and 3 demonstrate that this position must be modified or extended. Attitudes (symbolic or otherwise) clearly are associated with the overall pattern of policy endorsement. However, their predictive power is substantially enhanced if the issue on which the attitude is held is highly vested.
The results reported here probably underestimate the true moderating effect of vested interest on attitude-criterion consistency. The indicators of vested interest used in the analyses were not as specific as would be desired. Employed because of the secondary analytic nature of the research, the proxy measures of vested interest were defined on the basis of objective information that did not necessarily comport with respondents' views regarding the subjective self-relevance of the issues. Of necessity, the measures were not as good as they should have been. This concern is most obvious in the analyses using the least precise indicators of vested interest. For example, it is very possible (perhaps likely) that many respondents who had children between the ages of 14 and 17 years were not at all concerned with college admissions quotas because their children were not planning to attend college. And even for those whose children were planning to attend college, admissions may have been so far in the future, or so assured, that the quota issue was not self-relevant. In this instance, children's ages, the proxy measure of vested interest, was much less efficient than was desired. Despite using relatively rough measures of vested interest, however, a substantial moderating effect emerged in every case. The analyses suggest that among the multitude of influences on political behavior, the importance of vested interest in moderating the effect of attitudes on political behavior should not be underestimated.
We believe that these analyses should put to rest any doubt of the importance of vested interest in the realm of important political opinions. A long history of social-psychological research suggests that the hedonic relevance of an issue to an individual should influence the relationship between that person's attitude and his or her behavior (Petty & Krosnick, 1995) . The evidence reported in our analyses suggests strongly that policy behaviors cannot be considered an exception to this general pattern. These observations do not negate or even challenge the central thrust of the symbolic politics approach. Logically, there is nothing in symbolic politics that necessarily requires that self-interest play no role in the attitude-endorsement equation. Future studies may profit from developing more specific measures of vested interest and policy attitudes over a wider range of domains.
The overall pattern of results is clear. In every analysis conducted, the relationship between attitude and political opinion was considerably stronger for individuals of high vested interest. These patterns occurred using three independently drawn national samples collected between 1972 and 1986. The policy domains examined spanned racial, economic, and social issues. The research clearly supports the importance of attitudes (symbolic or otherwise) in political behavior and just as clearly confirms the importance of vested interest in predicting and understanding political action.
